Space: The Final next Frontier Note by Birkeland, Bonny
University of Minnesota Law School 
Scholarship Repository 
Minnesota Law Review 
2020 
Space: The Final next Frontier Note 
Bonny Birkeland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Birkeland, Bonny, "Space: The Final next Frontier Note" (2020). Minnesota Law Review. 3260. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3260 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 






Space: The Final Next Frontier 
Bonny Birkeland 
Aye, the celestials have swooped down themselves, 
Grim bent on miracles or incarnations. 
Earth and her offspring patiently endured, 
(Having no choice) and as the years rolled by 
In trial and toil prepared their counterstroke – 
And now ‘tis man who dares assault the sky. 
Fear not, Immortals, we forgive your faults, 
And as we come to claim our promised place 
Aim only to repay the good you gave 
And warm with human love the chill of space. 
 
—Professor Thomas G. Bergin, “For a Space Prober,” the first poem 
launched into outer space, 1961.1 
 
  [O]ur destiny beyond the Earth is not only a matter of national iden-
tity, but a matter of national security. So important for our military. So 
important. And people don’t talk about it. When it comes to defending 
America, it is not enough to merely have an American presence in space, 
we must have American dominance in space. So important. 
 
—President Donald J. Trump2 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like 
to thank Professor Finnuoula Ní Aoláin for her thoughtful comments and guid-
ance throughout this process. Thank you to the hard and ever-working editors 
and staffers of the Minnesota Law Review for their careful and considerate edits. 
Thanks as well to the Guardians of the High Frontier who continue to serve and 
protect in the United States Armed Forces. Copyright © 2020 by Bonny Birke-
land.  
 1. Phil Leonard, Message to the Gods: The Space Poetry that Transcends 
Human Rivalries, CONVERSATION (Nov. 15, 2017), http://theconversation.com/ 
message-to-the-gods-the-space-poetry-that-transcends-human-rivalries-86572 
[https://perma.cc/C2PR-HNYU]. 
 2. NBC News, President Donald Trump: We Will Have the Space Force, 
“Separate but Equal,” YOUTUBE (June 18, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=5lEaLcumd08 [https://perma.cc/7YQE-GKD3].  
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  INTRODUCTION   
Space wars have long been a thing of science fiction. To date, 
there has never been an armed attack in outer space. Yet as the 
world enters its sixth decade in the “Space Age,”3 advancements 
in science and technology bring with it the acute possibility of 
armed conflict erupting in outer space.4 The final frontier is fre-
quently being discussed in terms of “battlefield[s],”5 “war-
fighting,”6 and the next theater of warfare.7 This increase in bel-
licose rhetoric marks a shift towards the stark reality that space 
has joined its three warfare counterparts—air, land, and sea—
as a viable war domain.8 In fact, the United States Senate re-
 
 3. Sputnik 1, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/ 
image_feature_924.html [https://perma.cc/2GSF-UDLN] (last updated Aug. 7, 
2017) (stating that on October 4, 1957, Sputnik 1 was successfully launched into 
orbit in outer space). 
 4. See, e.g., Michel Bourbonnière & Ricky J. Lee, Jus ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello Considerations on the Targeting of Satellites: The Targeting of Post-
Modern Military Space Assets, in ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 167, 167 
(Yoram Dinstein ed., 2014) (quoting W.B. Scott, USSC Prepares for Future Com-
bat Missions in Space, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 51, 51 (1996) (quoting 
General Joseph W. Ashy, Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command, as say-
ing, “Some people don’t want to hear this, and it sure isn’t in vogue, but – abso-
lutely – we’re going to fight in space. We’re going to fight from space and we’re 
going to fight into space when [orbital assets] become so precious that it’s in our 
national interest to do so. That’s why the U.S. has development programs in 
directed energy and hit-to-kill mechanisms.”)). 
 5. Adam Irish, The Legality of a U.S. Space Force, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 13, 
2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/09/13/the-legality-of-a-u-s-space-force/ 
[https://perma.cc/LR8R-NE33]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT ON ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGE-
MENT STRUCTURE FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE COMPONENTS OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/09/ 
2001952764/-1/-1/1/ORGANIZATIONAL-MANAGEMENT-STRUCTURE 
-DOD-NATIONAL-SECURITY-SPACE-COMPONENTS.PDF [https://perma 
.cc/RJF8-DQ2E] (outlining America’s impending need for a United States Space 
Command to “improve and evolve space warfighting”). 
 8. See Helene Cooper, Pence Advances Plan to Create a Space Force, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/us/politics/trump 
-pence-space-force.html [https://perma.cc/3MLQ-P4LR]; see also President Don-
ald Trump, supra note 2; White House Fact Sheet, President Donald J. Trump 
Is Launching America’s Space Force, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 23, 2018), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump 
-launching-americas-space-force/ [https://perma.cc/FBW2-QG2A]. India is mir-
roring the United States’ aggressive rhetoric after they successfully targeted 
their own satellite. Doris Elin Urrutia, India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Is a 
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cently passed the National Defense Authorization Act which es-
tablished a United States Space Force as a distinct armed force 
within the Department of the Air Force.9 The Space Force is 
tasked with “protect[ing] the interests of the United States in 
space [and] deterr[ing] aggression in, from, and to space . . . .”10 
Thus, with the birth of the United States Space Force, the like-
lihood of armed conflict rupturing in space is all but certain.  
Accordingly, other States11 have increased their space capa-
bilities as the world launches into a new armed race in outer 
space.12 The armed race largely revolves around State-develop-
ment of dual-use satellites and the means or methods of war-
fare13 used to incapacitate these satellites. The United States, 
China, India, and Russia have invested heavily in anti-satellite 
technology (ASAT) and associated capabilities in response to the 
growing military applications of satellites.14 These dual-use sat-
ellites are used in both military and civilian contexts, and it is 
 
Big Deal. Here’s Why, SPACE.COM (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.space.com/ 
india-anti-satellite-test-significance.html (quoting Satish Dua, former Chief of 
Integrated Defense Staff of the Indian Army, as saying: “India has to be fully 
equipped for war—whether it is subsurface, surface, air or space war-
fare . . . . Space pervades all warfare as it enables intelligence and surveillance, 
information warfare, [and] cyber domain[s].”). 
 9. National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 9091, 133 
Stat. 1198 (2020). 
 10. Id. § 9091(d)(1)–(2).  
 11. For the purposes of this Note, “States” refers to sovereign nations as 
commonly understood under international law. 
 12. See generally SECURE WORLD FOUND., GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPA-
BILITIES: AN OPEN SOURCE ASSESSMENT (Brian Weeden & Victoria Samson 
eds., 2018), https://swfound.org/media/206118/swf_global_counterspace_ 
april2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWD9-7SYU] (finding that States, such as 
China, Russia, and the United States, have increased development of a broad 
range of kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace capabilities); David A. Koplow, 
The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space, 59 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 331, 332 (2018) (discussing the current arms race in space and what 
measures should be taken to prevent it).  
 13. See generally Bill Boothby, Space Weapons and the Law, 93 INT’L L. 
STUD. 179, 181 (2017) (distinguishing means of warfare as weapons such as 
projectiles, space vehicles, and lasers used kinetically to attack a space vehicle 
from methods of warfare which are activities designed to adversely impact an 
enemy’s military operations or capacity such as nudging another space vehicle 
out of orbit, shading, or other interference with an enemy’s space assets).  
 14. Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS (Jan. 2012), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/ 
documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
V6Y7-WFAD] (providing an overview of ASAT programs by spacefaring na-
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often difficult to distinguish between the two.15 In recent years, 
States have demonstrated their increasing ability to conduct ki-
netic16 attacks against satellites in orbit17 or engage in hostile 
in-orbit disruptions.18  
The stakes are high. The United States relies on space more 
than any other nation for the full range of its military and civil-
ian activities.19 Were adversaries to launch an attack on United 
States space assets, the repercussions would be catastrophic. For 
instance, 
televisions would go blank, mobile networks silent, and the Internet 
would slow and then stop. Dependent on time stamps from GPS satel-
lites, everything from stock markets to bank transactions to traffic 
lights and railroad switches would freeze. Airline pilots would lose con-
tact with the ground, unsure of their position and without weather data 
to steer around storms. World leaders couldn’t communicate across 
continents. In the US military, pilots would lose contact with armed 
 
tions); see also BRIAN WEEDEN, THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY, CHINESE, AMERI-
CAN, AND RUSSIAN ANTI-SATELLITE TESTING IN SPACE (2014), http://swfound 
.org/media/167224/through_a_glass_darkly_march2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WP8N-R9GH] (outlining the ASAT capabilities of China, Russia, and the 
United States). 
 15. Jane C. Hu, The Battle for Space, SLATE (Dec. 23, 2014), https://slate 
.com/technology/2014/12/space-weapon-law-u-s-china-and-russia-developing 
-dangerous-dual-use-spacecraft.html [https://perma.cc/5UKC-422Y].  
 16. See Boothby, supra note 13, at 206. 
 17. Just this past March, India demonstrated their ASAT capabilities by 
targeting a satellite in the Low-Earth Orbit. Urrutia, supra note 8; see also 
Brian Weeden, 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet, SECURE WORLD 
FOUND. (Nov. 23, 2010), https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_ 
sheet_updated_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/MST9-FKXC]. 
 18. See Jim Sciutto, US Military Prepares for the Next Frontier: Space War, 
CNN (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/28/politics/space-war-us 
-military-preparations/index.html [https://perma.cc/98JM-PED9] (“Russia has 
deployed what could be multiple kamikaze satellites such as ‘Kosmos 2499’—
designed to sidle up to American satellites and then, if ordered, disable or de-
stroy them. China has launched the ‘Shiyan’—equipped with a grappling arm 
that could snatch US satellites right out of orbit.”). 
 19. See id. See generally U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., DEV., CONCEPTS & DOC-
TRINE CTR., SPACE: DEPENDENCIES, VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS (2012), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/33689/20120313mne7_space_vulnerabilites.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4ABT-A2MS] (discussing the wider range of military and civilian fa-
cilities provided from outer space); Joseph N. Pelton, Satellite Communications, 
in SPACE DEVELOPMENT 15 fig. 2.6 (2012) (listing several examples of the broad 
range of expanding global satellite applications).  
  
2020] SPACE: THE NEXT FRONTIER 2065 
 
drones over the Middle East. Smart bombs would become dumb. Mis-
siles would sit immobile in their silos. The US could lose early warning 
of nuclear attacks for parts of the Earth.20 
It is crucial to identify the way international humanitarian 
law, jus in bello,21 will apply to armed conflict in outer space. The 
present surge in space weapons development coupled with the 
unique physical environment of outer space underpin the ur-
gency with which States must form a consensus regarding the 
application of jus in bello to military space operations. Any emer-
gent consensus must take due consideration of how to adapt the 
Use of Force doctrine appropriately to the context of outer void 
space. Jus in bello’s Use of Force doctrine regulates combatant 
activities in conflict and outlines four considerations when using 
force: distinction,22 proportionality,23 humanity,24 and military 
necessity.25 Of note, the complex nature of dual-use satellites 
and exceptional physical characteristics of outer space will ne-
cessitate a different proportionality consideration than a terres-
trially-based attack.26 While distinction, humanity, and military 
necessity continue to be relevant factors in determining whether 
an actor complies with jus in bello in outer space, these factors 
are outside of the scope of this Note because any analysis under 
the proportionality principle presupposes that the attack used a 
 
 20. Sciutto, supra note 18. 
 21. Jus in bello refers to the law of armed conflict. It is the law that governs 
the use of force between States. See infra Part I.C. 
 22. G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), at 50 (Dec. 19, 1968) (“That distinction must be 
made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members 
of the civilian population to the effect that the civilians be spared as much as 
possible.”). 
 23. U.S DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 2.4 (2015), https://dod 
.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20 
Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12 
-13-172036-190 [https://perma.cc/NR6J-R55X]; see also Letter from Daniel Web-
ster to Henry S. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, THE DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF 
DANIEL WEBSTER, WHILE SECRETARY OF STATE 110 (1848) (explaining that 
even actions taken in self-defense should not be “unreasonable or excessive” 
since such actions “justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by 
that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”). 
 24. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 23, § 2.3 (defining humanity as “the prin-
ciple that forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary 
to accomplish a legitimate military purpose”). 
 25. NATO, AAP-6, NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS, 82 (2019) 
(defining military necessity as “[t]he principle whereby a belligerent has the 
right to apply any measures that are required to bring about the successful con-
clusion of a military operation and that are not forbidden by the Law of War”). 
 26. See infra Parts II.A, III.C. 
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lawful weapon and the target is a legitimate military target.27 
Instead, this Note will narrow in on the complexities around de-
termining proportionality in outer space.  
This Note explores the implications of the use of force in 
outer space under the current space and jus in bello regimes. 
Looking at the use of kinetic and direct energy ASATs28 under a 
proportionality calculus, this Note will propose a new considera-
tion framework which outlines what an actor would have to con-
sider before acting in order to comply with the proportionality 
principle. Part I will lay down the necessary conceptual basis for 
developing this new proportionality framework in three dimen-
sions. First, it discusses the existing space corpus juris.29 Second, 
it explores the emerging ASAT threat and several ASAT tech-
nologies which will then be evaluated under the new proportion-
ality framework in Part III. Third, it explores the legal scholar-
ship on armed conflict; in particular, the literature on 
proportionality and its considerations. Part II will highlight the 
gaps between space law and jus in bello. Specifically, it discusses 
the regimes’ deficiencies due to imperfect analogies to other 
earth-warfare domains, the lack of clear legal definitions for con-
cepts in space law, and the uniqueness of the outer space envi-
ronment. Part III argues jus in bello does apply, and it is imper-
ative that it applies to outer space. It then outlines a framework 
which incorporates four considerations an actor should take be-
fore employing ASATs, including determining the operational 
nature of the satellite, where the target is situated, the antici-
pated harm to the environment and civilians, and the military 
advantage expected to be gained. This Note demonstrates the 
four considerations’ workability through its application to two 
ASAT technologies. Ultimately, this Note’s essential purpose is 
to supply a workable framework for State actors to use when de-
termining whether targeting legitimate military objects with 
ASATs complies with the proportionality principle under jus in 
bello. 
 
 27. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 4, at 200. 
 28. For the purposes of space, in this Note, only hit-to-kill kinetic weapons 
and jamming will be discussed in depth and analyzed under the framework in 
Part III. 
 29. Corpus juris refers to the existing body of law. Corpus Juris, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
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I.  THE MIRE OF SPACE LAW AND JUS IN BELLO   
This Part discusses, in three steps, the scope of the current 
space law regime, the emerging ASAT threat, and the legal 
scholarship on the proportionality principle in the jus in bello 
regime. Section A discusses the development of the space law re-
gime and how it presently functions. Section B reveals the emer-
gent threats posed by ASAT technology, and in particular, two 
ASAT technologies—hit-to-kill and jamming ASATs. Section C 
provides an overview of jus in bello and the proportionality prin-
ciple in detail. 
A. THE SPACE LAW REGIME 
The space corpus juris30 developed during the infant years 
of the space race and since 1979, there have not been any treaties 
added to the space law regime.31 There are five main treaties 
which comprise the space corpus juris.32 Of the five main trea-
ties, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the most comprehensive 
treaty, and it heads the space law regime as a hopeful, quasi-
constitution for space.33 The OST has the most bearing on the 
question of whether jus in bello applies to outer space. The pre-
amble to the OST provides that the exploration and use of space 
shall be for “peaceful purposes.”34 Markedly, the term “peaceful” 
 
 30. Corpus juris is Latin for “body of law.” Id.  
 31. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 32. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter OST] (bestowing upon astronauts the 
unique status of “envoys of mankind”); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched in Outer Space, 
Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 (creating an affirmative duty for Contracting Par-
ties to search for, rescue, and unconditionally return astronauts to the launch-
ing authority); Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 (stating Contracting Parties are 
liable for damage to people or property caused by their space activities whether 
such damage occurs on Earth, in outer space, or on the moon or other celestial 
body); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 
14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 (establishing a space object registry whereby “launching 
States” are required to furnish certain information regarding each space object 
launched into space); Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing that the 
moon and its natural resources belong to the “common heritage of mankind”). 
 33. J.I. Gabrynowicz, The “Province” and “Heritage” of Mankind Reconsid-
ered: A New Beginning, 2 SECOND CONF. ON LUNAR BASES & SPACE ACTIVITIES 
691, 692 (1992). 
 34. See OST, supra note 32. 
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is not defined by the treaty.35 During the drafting of the OST, 
there was an East-West divide over whether “peaceful” means 
“non-military” or “non-aggressive.”36 Non-military would bar all 
military activity in space, whereas non-aggressive would allow 
for peacetime military activities.37 Today, through consistent 
and uniform State practice, it is widely understood “peaceful” 
means “non-aggressive.”38  
The OST’s Article III and Article IV speak directly to the 
issue of the legality of military activities in space. Article III re-
quires all activities in the exploration and use of outer space to 
be in accordance with international law.39 This provision pro-
tects all the rights bundled in the UN Charter, including, “the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” under Ar-
ticle 51.40 Article IV prohibits nuclear weapons and weapons of 
mass destruction from being “stationed” in space.41 The partial 
weapons ban does not proscribe the stationing of non-nuclear 
weapons in space, such as anti-ballistic missiles, killer satellites, 
or anti-satellite weapons.42 Nor does this partial ban affect a nu-
clear weapon making a temporary transit through outer space 
toward its intended target, since it is not “stationed” in space.43 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Paul B. Larsen & Francis Lyall, The Military Use of Outer Space, in 
SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 469 (2d ed. 2018). See infra Part II.B.1 for an in-depth 
discussion of “peaceful purposes.” 
 37. See Larsen & Lyall, supra note 36. 
 38. Fabio Tronchetti, The Applicability of Rules of International Humani-
tarian Law to Military Conflicts in Outer Space: Legal Certainty or Time for a 
Change?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 
357, 362 (2012).  
 39. OST, supra note 32, art. III (“States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on 
activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Char-
ter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and 
security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.” (empha-
sis added)). 
 40. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 41. See OST, supra note 32, art. 4 (“States Parties to the Treaty undertake 
not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or 
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celes-
tial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”). 
 42. Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space, in 
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 331, 337 (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti 
eds., 2015). 
 43. See David Koplow, ASAT-ISFACTION: Customary International Law 
and Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 1187, 1198 
(2009).  
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Read together, Article III and IV anticipate military activity in 
space, but they do not provide strong fetters against State mili-
tary action. To its own detriment, the OST did not include any 
specific provisions relating to its application in wartime, and the 
Articles are an uninspiring effort to restrain States.44 This lack-
luster approach has resulted in the current quagmire of scholar-
ship discussing the OST’s applicability to wartime and the 
hounding doubt which follows.45 The uncertainty stemming from 
the OST’s silence on the applicability of the jus in bello to mili-
tary operations in space is at the heart of this Note. Specifically, 
this Note considers how proportionality will shake out in space 
confrontations. 
B. THE EMERGENT THREATS POSED BY ASAT TECHNOLOGIES  
The emergent threats posed by ASAT technology are di-
rectly related to the military and civilian value of satellites and 
their orbitals. This value is compounded by the ubiquitous de-
pendence States place upon satellites for everyday civilian and 
military functions. Section B.1 provides an overview of the value 
of satellites and their orbitals proceeded by Section B.2, which 
elaborates on ASAT technologies and describes their character-
istics. 
1. Satellites and Orbitals 
Satellites are indispensable to force enhancement during 
armed conflict. They support military operations through essen-
tial tasks such as providing secure and high-volume unsecured 
communications, targeting and navigational services, weather 
prediction, and battle assessment.46 Unsurprisingly, satellites 
make excellent military targets due to their high military 
 
 44. See OST, supra note 32. 
 45. Arjeen Vermeer, The Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implica-
tions for the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponi-
sation of Outer Space, in THE NEW ORDER OF WAR 69, 74 (Bob Brecher ed., 2010) 
(“But it cannot be simply assumed that [the jus in bello] corpus applies in toto 
to armed conflict in outer void space, just because of the unique environment 
that the latter presents.”); cf. Steven Freeland, The Laws of War in Outer Space, 
in HANDBOOK OF SPACE SECURITY, 81, 102 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2015) 
(“Overall, given the unique nature of outer space, the fundamental principles of 
the laws of war—developed to regulate terrestrial warfare and armed conflict—
are probably neither sufficiently specific nor entirely appropriate for military 
action in outer space.”). 
 46. Grego, supra note 14. 
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value.47 As States increasingly invest in satellite technology, the 
more they become dependent upon them, and the greater likeli-
hood those satellites may be compromised by hostile forces seek-
ing to disrupt satellite functions in a time of conflict.48 Addition-
ally, besides the tactical advantage of disrupting an adversary’s 
military capabilities, satellites make good targets because they 
are difficult to defend.49 They are the “soft underbelly” of a 
State’s national security.50 For one, they are relatively few in 
number,51 thereby destroying even a handful could have a cata-
strophic effect on an adversary. Second, satellites are “soft,” they 
lack heavy shielding or the ability to defend themselves.52 A sat-
ellite’s primary source of protection comes from the difficulties 
associated with launching an attack through the unique space 
environment to a specific location.53 Third, satellites follow 
known orbits with little ability to divert their trajectories.54 
Fourth, they are not usually equipped with sensors which alert 
them to an attack, or even if they are alert-equipped, the sensors 
are unable to tell them who is attacking.55 Fifth, satellites are 
 
 47. Japan, Australia Ask China to Explain Space Missile, TRUTH SEEKER 
(Jan. 21, 2007), http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/?ps=5965 [https://perma.cc/ 
R6A9-3R98].  
 48. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ANTI-SATELLITE 
WEAPONS, COUNTER-MEASURES, AND ARMS CONTROL 33 (1985) (“The value, or 
utility, of military satellites is very real, but it is extremely difficult to quantify. 
The timeliness of information or the speed of communications may make the 
difference between winning a battle and losing one . . . .”). 
 49. See, e.g., SPACE SECURITY 147 (2008). 
 50. See Japan, Australia Ask China to Explain Space Missile, supra note 
47 (quoting Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) as saying, “American satellites are 
the soft underbelly of our national security”). 
 51. UCS Satellite Database, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS [hereinafter 
UCS Satellite Database], https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space 
-weapons/satellite-database?_ga=2.245242117.1030392505.1542561754 
-1434941526.1542561754#.W_GgH_ZFzb0 [https://perma.cc/3WGG-G5AG] 
(last updated Dec. 16, 2019) (stating there are 2218 operational satellites in 
orbit). 
 52. SPACE SECURITY, supra note 49, at 147. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. (discussing some defender advantages that arise with different or-
bital paths. For example, satellites in lower altitude orbits are difficult to detect 
with space-based infrared sensors due to their proximity to Earth’s atmosphere. 
Low-altitude orbits are also less predictable due to the fluctuation in atmos-
pheric effects. Alternatively, higher altitude orbits raise power demands for ter-
restrial radars and provided targeted satellites with longer warning times). 
 55. See Koplow, supra note 43, at 1200. 
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expensive.56 States and private actors often do not maintain a 
fleet of spares.57 Lastly, satellites function differently depending 
on which orbit they occupy.58 
There are three types of orbits59 relevant to this Note’s pro-
portionality principle framework: Low-Earth Orbit (LEO), Me-
dium-Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
(GEO).60 The difference in orbitals is significant for three rea-
sons. First the amount of debris in each orbit is varied.61 This 
means an attack with resultant debris will have a different effect 
on each orbit, altering the proportionality calculation.62 Second, 
some orbitals have a higher “real estate” value than others.63 
Lastly, the type of information each satellite transmits varies 
between the orbitals, which may influence the target’s legiti-
macy and military value.64  
 
 56. Gary Brown & William Harris, How Much Do Satellites Cost?, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://science.howstuffworks.com/satellite10.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/TU4H-SGCW] (stating a satellite may cost as much as $290 million to 
build and an additional $10–400 million to launch).  
 57. See SPACE SECURITY, supra note 49, at 148 (“In general, there is cur-
rently little redundancy of commercial, military, or civilian space systems, par-
ticularly of the space-based components, because of the large per-kilogram cost 
of launch.”).  
 58. See Gary Brown & William Harris, How Satellites Work, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS (May 19, 2000), https://science.howstuffworks.com/satellite7 
.htm [https://perma.cc/A76Q-2CJD].  
 59. See JOINT STAFF-MN//ACT, MULTINATIONAL EXPERIMENT 7 ACCESS TO 
GLOBAL COMMONS: PROTECTING ACCESS TO SPACE, 1-3 fig.1.1 (July 8, 2013), for 
different orbital altitudes. 
 60. These three areas of space contain roughly ninety-five percent of oper-
ational satellites. David Wright, The Current Space Debris Situation, UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 2 (2010), https://swfound.org/media/99971/wright 
-space-debris_situation.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNP2-W3A6]. See Pelton, supra 
note 19, at 11 tbl.2.1, for a list of the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with each orbital. 
 61. See Fatima Ahmed Mohamed & Noor Azian Mohamad Ali, Space Debris 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO), 4 INT’L J. SCI. & RES. 1591 (2013). 
 62. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 63. See, e.g., THE SPACE ECONOMY AT A GLANCE 52 (2014) (stating GEO sat-
ellites are the most profitable orbits). 
 64. See infra notes 67, 73, 78 and accompanying text. 
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LEO do not have a formal definition, but it is generally con-
sidered to have an apogee65 of roughly 1000 kilometers.66 LEOs 
are favorable for observation, environmental monitoring, and 
small communications satellites.67 These orbits are advanta-
geous due to their proximity to earth, which allows them to use 
less powerful sensors and transmitters and deliver ultra-high 
bandwidth with less delay than GEO satellites.68 For these rea-
sons, the U.S. military is increasing its investment in LEO capa-
bilities to support its real-time command-and-control needs.69 
However, the debris situation in LEO may be reaching a tipping 
point.70 The rising instability in the current LEO environment is 
both a growing concern and consideration in the proportionality 
calculus for any military action taken against a satellite in LEO. 
MEO similarly lacks a formal definition, but it is considered 
to include orbits between LEO and GEO.71 Satellites in this area 
 
 65. The point in an orbit that is furthest from the Earth. Apogee, DICTION-
ARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/apogee [https://perma.cc/D67L 
-PKH2]. 
 66. See JOINT STAFF-MN//ACT, supra note 59, ¶ 108. They have an orbit 
period between 1.5 and 3 hours as well as an orbital speed of about 7 kilometers 
per second. Wright, supra note 60, at 2. 
 67. See JOINT STAFF-MN//ACT, supra note 59, ¶ 108. 
 68. Id.; Anne Wainscott-Sargent, LEO/MEO Satellites Poised to Make a 
Mark in Military Sector, VIA SATELLITE (Feb. 12, 2018), http://interactive. 
satellitetoday.com/leo-meo-satellites-poised-to-make-a-mark-in-military 
-sector/ [https://perma.cc/2PQR-9YBX]. 
 69. Wainscott-Sargent, supra note 68 (quoting Tim Deaver, Corporate Vice 
President of Development and Strategy for SES Government Solutions, saying: 
“Government interest is growing day by day as they start to appreciate the ca-
pabilities and see the benefits they can get from low latency and high through-
put”).  
 70. See infra Part II.C.2, for a discussion on the Kessler syndrome. See also 
INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMM., STABILITY OF THE FU-
TURE LEO ENVIRONMENT (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/ 
stsc2013/tech-12E.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5BK-QFUW]; Michael J. Listner, UN 
Report: Space Debris in Low Earth Orbit May Be Reaching the Tipping Point, 
SPACE SAFETY MAG. (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/ 
space-debris/kessler-syndrome/report-space-debris-low-earth-orbit-reaching 
-tipping-point/ [https://perma.cc/J8MD-5XBQ]. But see Koplow, supra note 43, 
at 1203 (arguing while debris is a concern at all altitudes, debris “generated at 
relatively low altitudes will usually degrade quite quickly, falling out of orbit 
and ordinarily burning up when re-entering the earth’s atmosphere.” Whereas 
debris at higher altitudes will remain in orbit for years, decades, or even  
centuries). 
 71. See JOINT STAFF-MN//ACT, supra note 59, ¶ 109. 
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reach altitudes of 20,000 kilometers.72 The functions of satellites 
in this zone consist predominantly of global positioning sys-
tems.73 The U.S. military is similarly increasing investment in 
satellites in MEO.74 While MEO is not nearly as congested as 
LEO, due to fewer satellites and the larger volume of space, the 
space debris environment of MEO has not been systematically 
investigated and is largely unknown.75  
GEO satellites have altitudes of approximately 36,000 kilo-
meters.76 GEO satellites fly around Earth at the same speed as 
Earth’s rotation which allows the satellite to appear stationary 
overhead and provide constant coverage.77 Some kinds of com-
munications, weather, surveillance, and warning systems satel-
lites use GEO.78 While assessing the space debris collision haz-
ard is more challenging for GEO than LEO, the desirability of 
GEO’s orbital real estate is leading it to become congested with 
operational and defunct satellites, increasing the likelihood of 
collisions.79  
All three orbitals are valuable in different ways: be it the 
tactical information they provide, the location the occupy, or the 
general services they afford.80 Due to the desirability of satellites 
to everyday State functions, it comes as no surprise that almost 
 
 72. Wright, supra note 60, at 2. They have an orbit of twelve-hour periods 
and orbital speeds of four kilometers per second. Id. 
 73. See JOINT STAFF-MN//ACT, supra note 59, ¶ 109. 
 74. Ryan Schradin, MEO: Bringing Robust and Secure Communications to 
the Military, GOV’T SATELLITE REPORT (Apr. 20, 2018), https://ses-gs.com/ 
govsat/defense-intelligence/meo-bringing-robust-secure-communications 
-military/ [https://perma.cc/32MX-DY9P] (noting the reliance of today’s military 
on IT solutions and capabilities—at home and in theater—which necessitates a 
satellite that can offer higher throughputs, more bandwidth, and lower latency). 
 75. JOSEPH N. PELTON, SPACE DEBRIS AND OTHER THREATS FROM OUTER 
SPACE 19–20 (Joseph N. Pelton, Jr. & William H. Ailor eds., 2013); Jiri Silha et 
al., An Optical Survey for Space Debris on Highly Eccentric and Inclined MEO 
Orbits, 59 ADVANCES SPACE RES. 181, 182 (2017).  
 76. Stephen Clark, U.S. Military Orders Two More Surveillance Satellites 
to Roam Geosynchronous Orbit, SPACEFLIGHT NOW (Apr. 10, 2017), https:// 
spaceflightnow.com/2017/04/10/u-s-military-orders-two-more-surveillance 
-satellites-to-roam-geosynchronous-orbit/ [https://perma.cc/2RX3-858C].  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Marric Stephens, Space Debris Threat to Geosynchronous Satellites Has 
Been Drastically Underestimated, PHYSICSWORLD (Dec. 12, 2017), https:// 
physicsworld.com/a/space-debris-threat-to-geosynchronous-satellites-has-been 
-drastically-underestimated/ [https://perma.cc/B88S-HK4E].  
 80. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
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as soon after States developed satellites, they began developing 
ASAT technology.81 
2. Anti-Satellite Technology 
ASATs are weapons that are used to incapacitate or destroy 
satellites as military objectives.82 There are two basic types of 
ASATs: kinetic and directed energy ASATs.83 Historically, ki-
netic ASATs are “the most common forms of space weaponry.”84 
Kinetic ASATs will destroy or incapacitate a satellite by collision 
using a single missile, releasing a cloud of pellets into the path 
of the satellite, or by sidling up close enough to blow up both 
itself and the targeted satellite.85 Hit-to-kill ASATs function 
without explosives: instead, the energy released by the collision 
of two spacecrafts rushing towards each other at closing speeds 
of almost 36,000 feet per second suffice to destroy satellites.86 
Yet, given the tremendous speeds at which objects orbit, almost 
anything properly aimed could become a weapon—even masses 
as small as paint flecks.87 The main concern for hit-to-kill ASATs 
 
 81. The first studies of military space satellites were initiated in 1946 by 
the U.S. Navy. FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, THE HISTORY OF US ANTISATELLITE 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS 4, https://fas.org/man/eprint/leitenberg/asat.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WM7K-PQDK]. Notions of anti-satellite defense developed as early as 
April 1954, well in advance of launching the first satellites. Id. at 5. 
 82. U.S. AIR FORCE, COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS: AIR FORCE DOCTRINE 
DOCUMENT 2-2.1 at 4, 33 (2004), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2_2-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZY3Y-VJKP]. 
 83. See Koplow, supra note 43, at 1200. 
 84. Robert A. Ramey, The Law of War in Space, GLOBAL NETWORK AGAINST 
WEAPONS & NUCLEAR POWER SPACE (Mar. 13, 2001), http://www.space4peace 
.org/slaw/lawofwar.htm#sixa [https://perma.cc/MD3Z-Y4PS]. 
 85. See Boothby, supra note 13, at 206; see also Larsen & Lyall, supra note 
36, at 469–70. 
 86. Paul Glenshaw, The First Space Age, AIR & SPACE MAG. (April 2018), 
https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/first-space-ace-180968349/ 
[https://perma.cc/8DQN-8UEG] (providing an overview of the history of the 
United States’ ASAT capabilities). 
 87. Id. Objects in low-Earth orbits travel at speeds on the order of 4.7 miles 
per second. DAVID E. LUPTON, ON SPACE WARFARE: A SPACE POWER DOCTRINE 
13 (1988). For an example of the tremendous speeds at which objects orbit and 
how any object may become a weapon, consider that a 4,000-pound car would 
have to travel at roughly 270 miles an hour to equal the kinetic energy of a one-
pound object traveling at 4.7 miles per second. Id. See Part II.C.2, for more dis-
cussion on space debris. 
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in the proportionality analysis will be the amount of space debris 
created by the offensive.88 
On the other hand, jamming ASATs (a subset of directed 
ASAT technology)89 disable rather than destroy their targets.90 
Satellite jamming interferes with radio communications be-
tween the satellite and users on the ground.91 Jamming carries 
with it the possibility of being covert, as the effects are similar 
to the routine failures found in satellites, and as such, it would 
be difficult to detect.92 This is especially true since the majority 
of interference with satellite communications is unintentional 
and due to factors like poorly trained operators.93 However, there 
are noted instances of State actors and Non-State actors inten-
tionally jamming foreign satellite broadcasts and commercial 
communications within their territories.94 Despite these isolated 
instances of traced jamming to State actors, most jamming 
would be untraceable.95 With jamming, resultant space debris is 
not a concern since it will not produce particles other than the 
defunct satellite. The main concern, as it relates to the propor-
tionality principle, is the disruption to civilian usage and 
whether that disruption is excessive in relation to the military 
advantage expected to be gained. The next Section fleshes out 
how that civilian-military balance is carried out in jus in bello. 
 
 88. A U.S. shootdown created 285 pieces of debris which took almost nine-
teen years to fully reenter the atmosphere. See Glenshaw, supra note 86. Inter-
national outrage was sparked by the 2007 China ASAT missile which created 
3,000 pieces of debris. Weeden, supra note 17.  
 89. See Koplow, supra note 12, at 339 (explaining that directed energy 
ASAT technology uses either lasers, columns of sub-atomic particles, radio fre-
quency transmissions, or microwave generators to disable a satellite. Directed 
energy ASATs can burn holes in a satellite’s skin, blind its sensors, or possibly 
even employ cyber warfare to alter a satellite’s onboard operations and com-
mandeer it for the attacker’s own purposes). 
 90. Blair Stephenson Kuplic, Note & Comment, The Weaponization of 
Outer Space: Preventing an Extraterrestrial Arms Race, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 1123, 1139 (2014).  
 91. Grego, supra note 14, at 9 (explaining the “jamming” can interfere ei-
ther with the “uplink” (the ground-to-satellite transfer of data to be broadcast) 
or the “downlink” (satellite-to-ground data transfer)). 
 92. Kuplic, supra note 90, at 1139. 
 93. Grego, supra note 14, at 9.  
 94. Id. at 9 nn.29–30 (explaining that Iran used a jamming device to block 
American transmissions, and the Falun Gong jammed a Hong Kong-based sat-
ellite and broadcast its own message). 
 95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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C. JUS IN BELLO AND THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE  
Jus in bello, or the law applicable to the conduct in armed 
conflict, is a robust area of the law comprised of hundreds of con-
ventional and customary rules.96 Over time, several noteworthy 
principles have emerged which regulate armed conflict: military 
necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality.97 The jus 
in bello regime attempts to strike a balance between military ne-
cessity and humanity; as such, all four of these principles work 
in conjunction as “interdependent and reinforcing parts of a co-
herent system.”98 Military necessity allows certain actions nec-
essary to secure the complete submission of the enemy as quickly 
and efficiently as possible.99 Counterbalancing military neces-
sity is humanity, which outlaws the infliction of suffering or de-
struction that is unnecessary to achieve that legitimate military 
objective.100 Distinction has a long pedigree and is a central tenet 
of warfare; it requires parties to a conflict at all times to distin-
guish between combatants and civilians and direct attacks solely 
at the former.101 Proportionality demands that even when an at-
tack may be justified by military necessity, that attack does not 
cause unreasonable or excessive civilian injury in relation to the 
expected military advantage to be gained.102 These principles are 
codified in the 1907 Hague Conventions103 and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions104 together with their two Additional Protocols of 
 
 96. See generally IHL Database: Customary International Law, INT’L 
COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul 
[https://perma.cc/EG9Z-G63F] (listing customary international laws). 
 97. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 51–52; Vermeer, supra note 
45, at 74. 
 98. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 51–52. 
 99. Id.; see also LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY 
CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 40 (2d ed. 2019). 
 100. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 51–52; see also BLANK & NOONE, 
supra note 99, at 45. 
 101. BLANK & NOONE, supra note 99, at 48. 
 102. Id. at 58; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 51–52. 
 103. See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, an-
nexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 (establishing specific rules which pro-
hibit using poison, killing persons who have surrendered, improper use of flags 
and uniforms, the destruction or seizure of enemy property which is not neces-
sary, and the treacherous killing or wounding of enemy soldiers) [hereinafter 
1907 Hague Regulations].  
 104. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
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1977.105 However, the current scholarship raises serious doubts 
as to the applicability of jus in bello norms in outer space.106 It is 
important to note that these doctrines and their precursors are 
rooted in the concept of territoriality. The absence of a terrestrial 
platform in the outer space context raises problematic “fit” is-
sues. Yet, given the likelihood that hostilities will arise in outer 
space, it is necessary to determine how and to what extent jus in 
bello may be adapted to fit the unique outer space environment. 
Specifically, this Note fleshes out several of the nuances in the 
application of the proportionality principle to outer space, which 
comprehensively addresses some of these “fit” issues. 
The proportionality analysis begins with object distinction. 
Civilian objects cannot be the deliberate object of an attack, but 
attacks against military objectives are allowed.107 Civilian ob-
jects are defined in the negative: they are all objects that are not 
military objectives.108 On the other hand, military objectives are 
defined as those objects which “by their nature, location, purpose 
or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralisation [sic], 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.”109 If there exists any doubt as to whether an object 
normally dedicated to civilian purposes is being used militarily, 
the presumption is that it retains its civilian character and it 
 
[hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC 
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. The Geneva Con-
ventions are primarily concerned with maintaining human security and dignity 
during conflict. 
 105. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.  
 106. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 107. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME I: RULES 25 
(Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), http://www.loc 
.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Cust-Intl-Hum-Law_Vol-I.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5GK5-MS8J]. 
 108. Id. at 32 
 109. Id. at 29. 
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cannot be deliberately targeted.110 Attacks against military ob-
jectives are allowed and incidental damage to civilians or civilian 
objects is not strictly prohibited. For instance, the death of civil-
ians during an armed conflict does not in itself constitute a war 
crime.111 Jus in bello allows for military commanders to carry 
out proportionate attacks against military targets, even if such 
an attack will cause civilian death or injury.112 The proportion-
ality principle merely demands that “[c]ombatants must refrain 
from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage expected to be gained.”113 When conducting attacks, 
military officers need only consider the proportionality principle 
if civilians or civilian properties are at risk of harm.114 In other 
words, there is no requisite proportionality calculus should com-
batants choose to target enemy combatants. If a civilian object 
has lost its presumptive protection by making an effective con-
tribution to a military action and it becomes a legitimate mili-
tary objective, any damage caused to that object as a result of 
the attack may not be considered in the proportionality determi-
nation.115 Moreover, the proportionality principle addresses loss 
of life, injury, and damage to property; mere inconveniences or 
 
 110. Id. at 52 (listing several treaties and domestic instruments which share 
the presumption against civilian objects being military objectives language). 
 111. Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal 
Court to parties concerned about war crimes in Iraq (Feb. 9, 2006), https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20090327061739/http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
F596D08D-D810-43A2-99BB-B899B9C5BCD2/277422/OTP_letter_to_senders_ 
re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GK5-MS8J].  
 112. Id.  
 113. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 241. Even though this principle is 
articulated in the AP I which only applies to “any land, air or sea warfare,” it is 
accepted that this provision is a part of Customary International Law and there-
fore, applies to outer space. AP I, supra note 105, art. 49(1), 51(5)(b); see also 
IHL Database: Customary International Law, Rule 14. Proportionality in At-
tack, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/ 
docs/v1_rul_rule14 [https://perma.cc/W92H-YXLC].  
 114. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 23, at 242. 
 115. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 4, at 201. Article 52(2) of AP I provides 
the definition of a legitimate military object: “[M]ilitary objectives are limited 
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture 
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite mil-
itary advantage.” AP I, supra note 105, art. 52(2). 
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temporary losses are not a consideration in the calculation.116 
Any reasonably foreseeable effects must be included in the cal-
culus as collateral damage and remote harm are not included.117  
1. Applying the Proportionality Principle and Balancing 
Military Advantage with Civilian Losses 
Proportionality is a notoriously slippery concept. It con-
stantly straddles the question of “How much is too much?” with-
out coming to any concrete answer.118 By way of example, under 
the Geneva Convention, a school is a civilian object that is im-
mune from attack; however, the Convention allows for certain 
exceptions.119 If a civilian object loses its protection by making 
an effective contribution to a military action, it may become a 
legitimate military target. If a school has been taken over by hos-
tile forces, it becomes a legitimate military target.120 Presumably 
 
 116. See Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 4, at 200–01; see also Yoram Din-
stein, Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed Con-
flicts, 84 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT’L L. STUD. 183, 186 (2008) (“Yet it must be 
borne in mind that not every inconvenience to civilians ought to be considered 
relevant. In war-time, there are inevitable scarcities of foodstuffs and services. 
Indeed, food, clothing, petrol and other essentials may actually be rationed; 
buses and trains may not run on time; curfews and blackouts may impinge on 
the quality of life; etc. These do not count in the calculus of proportionality.”). 
 117. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 4, at 201. 
 118. FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED 
TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶¶ 48, 50, https://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report 
-prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against 
-federal [https://perma.cc/PA9D-T8ZB] [hereinafter NATO Bombing Report] 
(“The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not 
it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple to 
state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate destruc-
tive effect and undesirable collateral effects. For example, bombing a refugee 
camp is obviously prohibited if its only military significance is that people in the 
camp are knitting socks for soldiers. Conversely, an air strike on an ammunition 
dump should not be prohibited merely because a farmer is plowing a field in the 
area. Unfortunately, most applications of the principle of proportionality are not 
quite so clear cut . . . . One cannot easily assess the value of innocent human 
lives as opposed to capturing a particular military objective . . . . It is suggested 
that the determination of relative values must be that of the ‘reasonable mili-
tary commander.’”). 
 119. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Aug. 12, 1949), https://ihl-databases 
.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C 
12563CD002D6B5C&action=OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/QT52-692Y]. 
 120. Abdul Rehman Khan, Space Wars: Dual-Use Satellites, 14 RUTGERS 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314, 320–21 (2017). 
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the school’s operations are stilled during military operations and 
therefore, harm to the school is no longer a part of the propor-
tionality analysis.121 Yet, if there are children present while the 
military operations are taking place, those children must be ac-
counted for in the proportionality analysis.122 Children are civil-
ians who cannot be deliberately attacked;123 however, when the 
school becomes a military objective and children are present, the 
attack is lawful provided that the deaths of children are not ex-
cessive in relation to the military advantage expected to be 
gained by targeting the school.124 Which begs the difficult ques-
tion: How many children would there need to be present at the 
school to prohibit the attack on proportionality grounds?  
Civilian harm and loss in the satellite context is particularly 
thorny. For one, it is onerous to determine whether satellites 
constitute civilian objects. While there are official classifications 
of whether a satellite is governmental, commercial, military, or 
civil, in practice these lines are much more blurred.125 The pre-
sumption that a satellite is a civilian object may be easier to re-
but if these satellites are dual-use. Many satellite functions are 
the same between civil and military satellites. For instance, both 
types of satellites engage in communications, navigation, mete-
orological, and geodetic functions.126 In fact, there are several 
dual-use satellites which the United States uses for both mili-
tary and civil purposes.127 The information a satellite is trans-
ferring, or rendering may be civilian in nature, but easily taken 
over by necessary military objectives. Like the school that was a 
civilian object until it was taken over by hostile forces, here too, 
 
 121. Except to the extent that structural damage and future civilian use are 
calculated. See, e.g., Amos S. Guiara, Symposium, Determining a Legitimate 
Target: The Dilemma of the Decision-Maker, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 315 (2012). 
 122. See Khan, supra note 120, at 334. 
 123. See GC IV, supra note 104 (providing throughout that children are a 
special class of civilian that requires additional protections from harm and at-
tack). 
 124. AP I, supra note 105, art. 57. 
 125. Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www 
.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database [https://perma.cc/27CL-XU5S] (Excel 
chart is on file with author). 
 126. What Are Satellites Used For?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 
15, 2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/what-are-satellites-used [https:// 
perma.cc/V47L-FWDC]. 
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satellites may be civilian in function but taken over by a State’s 
military for certain, particular military actions. Thus, the civil-
ian-military function is much more difficult to definitively ascer-
tain. However, unlike the school example, civilians are not being 
directly killed in a satellite attack, rather the destruction civil-
ian satellite capacities are indirectly harming civilian objects, 
and potentially civilian lives.128 Second, what is a civilian pur-
pose, and when does a satellite provide an essential civilian pur-
pose to the civilian population? Is a geostationary satellite’s abil-
ity to predict a forest fire an essential civilian purpose?129 Is 
internet communication? Or mobile phone use? The satellite’s ci-
vilian purpose that it supports ties directly into whether the re-
sultant harm will be considered excessive. 
Another wrinkle in the proportionality calculus is the deter-
mination of what exactly is “excessive” in relation to the expected 
military advantage. Part of the difficulty in this determination 
lies in the comparison between civilian casualties and military 
advantage—they are like “metaphorical apples and oranges.”130 
One is a science, and the other an art. Civilian losses can be 
counted and civilian damages can be appraised, but quantifying 
military advantage is an undeniably more difficult task.131 Fur-
 
 128. See What Are Satellites Used For?, supra note 126. 
 129. Khan, supra note 120, at 336–37 (discussing whether satellites provide 
necessary information or just “really important” information). 
 130. See Dinstein, supra note 116, at 186; cf. Statement of Interest of the 
United States of America, Matar v. Dichter, 05 Civ. 10270 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
17, 2006); DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 465, 
471–72 (2006) (ebook) (“Again, the rub lies in determining what counts as ‘ex-
cessive.’ Any number of intangibles must be [c]onsidered: How important is the 
military objective sought to be achieved? What are the pros and cons of each 
option available to achieve that objective? For each option, what is the probabil-
ity of success? What are the costs of failure? What are the risks of civilian cas-
ualties involved in each option? What are the risks of military casualties in-
volved in each option? How are casualties of either kind to be weighed against 
the benefits of the operation? In short, questions of proportionality are highly 
open-ended, and the answers to them tend to be subjective and imprecise.”). 
 131. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 4, at 201; see also Hamutal Esther Sha-
mash, How Much Is Too Much? An Examination of the Principle of Jus in Bello 
Proportionality, 2 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 103, 117–20 (2005) (discussing the 
attempts of several scholars to classify “military advantage” according to a slid-
ing time scale which takes into account long-term damage as well as long-term 
military advantage). 
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thermore, some scholars have argued “excessive” is interchange-
able with “extensive.”132 However, this is a misreading of the 
text.133 Renowned international law of armed conflict scholar 
Yoram Dinstein acutely describes the difference between exten-
sive and excessive: 
The fact that collateral damage is extensive does not necessarily render 
it excessive. The concept of excessiveness is not an absolute one. Exces-
siveness is always measured in light of the military advantage that the 
attacker anticipates to attain through the attack. If the military ad-
vantage anticipated is marginal, the collateral damage expected need 
not be substantial in order to be excessive. Conversely, extensive col-
lateral damage may be legally justified by the military value of the tar-
get struck, because of the high military advantage anticipated by the 
attack.134 
This distinction is critical in the outer space context where there 
will likely be extensive damage to civilian property if a satellite 
is targeted.135 It is important not to conflate excessiveness with 
extensiveness and to evaluate the damage only in terms of its 
excessiveness.136  
 
 132. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, 626 (Yves Sandoz et al. 
eds., 1987), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/RC_commentary-1977.html 
[https://perma.cc/RCC8-D4ER] (asserting the AP I “does not provide any jus-
tification for attacks which cause extensive civilian losses and damages. Inci-
dental losses and damages should never be extensive”). 
 133. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 156–57 (2016); accord Dale Stephens & 
Cassandra Steer, Conflicts in Space: International Humanitarian Law and Its 
Application to Space Warfare, 40 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 1, 21–27 (2015). 
 134. THE PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, 
HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WAR-
FARE 98 (2013). 
 135. The space environment’s physical characteristics may result in an ad-
verse effect to the global commons and negatively impact neutral states, orbits, 
and the global civilian population. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 4, at 201. 
 136. This Note advocates for a hybrid subjective-objective standard when de-
termining whether a commander’s proportionality evaluation was reasonable. 
See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY OB-
JECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOL I, at 222 (2009) (“An assessment of the proportionality of an attack 
is based on the circumstances of the commander and the information available 
to him or her. However, the conclusions to be reached on whether collateral 
damage is expected and whether it is proportional is then based on what a rea-
sonable person would have concluded from that information.” (emphasis in orig-
inal)). 
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2. Additional Considerations Relating to the Environment and 
Proportionality 
The rule on damage caused to the natural environment by 
military activities is codified in Additional Protocol I,137 but for 
States who are not party to the Additional Protocol I,138 custom-
ary international law treats natural environments as a civilian 
object—meaning, the natural environment may not be the object 
of an attack, and it is further protected from wanton destruc-
tion.139 “Wanton destruction” constitutes action taken mali-
ciously which cannot be justified by imperative military neces-
sity.140 However, a forest may come under deliberate attack if it 
conceals, for example, an armor division and therefore qualifies 
as a military objective.141 Yet, even though the forest now quali-
fies as part of a military objective, the proportionality analysis 
will still need to account for the expected, additional, non-mili-
tary-objective collateral damage to the environment.142  
State practice comports with customary international law: 
there is general acceptance that damage to the natural environ-
ment is included in the proportionality principle calculation.143 
This notion is set forth by the Guidelines on the Protection of the 
Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, the San Remo Manual 
on Naval Warfare, and a number of official statements.144 For 
instance, during the NATO bombing campaign against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO stated “all possible collateral 
damage, be it environmental, human or to the civilian infrastruc-
ture” must be weighed and considered in the targeting deci-
sion.145 (emphasis added). Reiterating this sentiment, the Com-
mittee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
 
 137. See Boothby, supra note 13, at 190. 
 138. The United States is not party to Additional Protocol I, it has not ac-
cepted Articles 35(3) and 55, and it has “repeatedly expressed the view that 
these provisions are ‘overly broad and ambiguous’ and ‘not a part of customary 
law.’” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 23, § 6.10.3.1; accord Boothby, supra note 
13, at 190 n.37 (“[I]t is clear that the United States regards environmental dam-
age as only prohibited when it breaches proportionality.”). 
 139. THE PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY, supra note 134, at 206. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 205. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Rule 43. Application of General Principles on the Conduct of Hostilities 
to the Natural Environment, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases 
.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule43 [https://perma.cc/96TT-GRYV].  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (citing NATO Bombing Report, supra note 118, ¶ 58).  
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Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia found the bombing 
campaign’s environmental impact was “best considered from the 
underlying principles of the law of armed conflicts such as neces-
sity and proportionality.”146 In addition to avoiding excessive ci-
vilian harm or injury, the military officer must also avoid target-
ing which causes grave environmental harm that is 
disproportionate to the legitimate military advantage expected 
to be gained. This consideration will necessarily take on a new 
format in the context of the outer space environment. 
For any armed conflict occurring in outer space, the jus in 
bello regime will govern each parties’ conduct. To that end, the 
proportionality principle will help define to what extent jus in 
bello applies and any military commander deciding to target a 
satellite will have to consider relevant terrestrial calculations 
such as civilian injury, the expected military advantage to be 
gained, and the environmental impact of targeting a satellite. 
However, these considerations are complicated by the physical 
nature of space and the lack of substantive treaties governing 
conduct in space. These gaps in the space law regime implicate 
an imperfect application of jus in bello to void outer space. Part 
II discusses these gaps and highlights divergent scholarship on 
how these gaps might be filled or avoided. 
II.  PITFALLS OF THE CURRENT SPACE REGIME AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF 
JUS IN BELLO   
As previewed in Part I, there is divergent scholarship re-
garding the pitfalls of the current space regime and how those 
pitfalls may be appropriately patched. Therefore, the application 
of jus in bello’s proportionality principle to military space activi-
ties can only be a workable framework if it takes stock of these 
pitfalls and addresses them. For instance, the framework should 
consider how other global commons have dealt with the applica-
tion of jus in bello to their territories, use sufficiently clear legal 
definitions for concepts in space law, and differentiate and ac-
count for the physical environment of space.  
The two other global commons, the high seas and the Ant-
arctic, are examples of other applications of jus in bello to a par-
ticular physical space. While it may be an imperfect comparison 
as both global commons are terrestrial, by using them as a foun-
dation, it may be possible to analogize and draw inferences to 
 
 146. Id. (citing NATO Bombing Report, supra note 118, ¶ 63).  
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the use of force in space. The high seas and Antarctica are the 
terrestrial territories most like space for their physical charac-
teristics as well as their legal regimes and governing treaties. 
Section A discusses two examples of the applicability of jus in 
bello in the high seas and Antarctica and draws conclusions 
about a similar space application. Next, the lack of legal defini-
tions for concepts in space law make it difficult to apply interna-
tional law and consequently, jus in bello. Section B explores the 
impact varying legal definitions may have on the application of 
jus in bello to the space law regime. Lastly, the special physical 
characteristics of void outer space create another set of consider-
ations which must be accounted for. Section C deliberates space’s 
physical environment and draws several noteworthy character-
istics to the fore such as orbits, space debris, and space debris’ 
cascading effects. 
A. PARALLELS WITHIN THE GLOBAL COMMONS 
While the “analogical approach” has not been unanimously 
accepted in the literature,147 it is still worthwhile to compare 
outer space with two other global commons regimes which have 
been committed to “peaceful purposes”: the legal regimes of the 
high seas and Antarctica.148 Of the two, the high seas legal re-
gime is a closer, yet still imperfect analogy. For example, both 
outer space and the high seas are outside the jurisdiction of any 
one State;149 they are not subject to appropriation by States or 
 
 147. Compare Jeffrey Prevost, Law of Outer Space—Summarized, 19 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 595, 601 (1970) (“Unfortunately, the analogy is more romance than 
science. The sea, as relates to pertinent law, is a surface of two dimensions; 
space is a three dimensional volume within which man operates. Time itself 
contracts; gravity ceases. The shortest distance between two points is a curved 
line; navigation, as used on earth, is meaningless.”), and Stephan Hobe, Histor-
ical Background, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW: OUTER SPACE 
TREATY 107, 113 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009) (stating “no analogies to air 
law or sea law should be made” (emphases omitted)), and Bourbonnière & Lee, 
supra note 4, at 200 (arguing in land and naval attacks the proportionality cal-
culus is limited to the immediate attack area, whereas in space, the analysis is 
multi-dimensional and implicates effects on orbits, neutral states, and a poten-
tial global civilian population that relies on the space asset), with M.J. Peterson, 
The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law, 51 INT’L ORG. 245, 248–
52 (1997) (discussing the process and function of analogical reasoning). 
 148. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 88, opened 
for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also 
The Antarctic Treaty art. 1, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794. 
 149. OST, supra note 32, art. 1; UNCLOS, supra note 148, art. 87. 
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individuals;150 and they constitute vast spaces uninhabitable by 
humans independent of manmade vessels. Like outer space, the 
law of the high seas preserves the oceans as a common resource 
for all.151  
Article 88 in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the analogous “peaceful pur-
poses” provision.152 Despite this “peaceful purposes” provision, 
historically, maritime spaces have not been considered immune 
to military activity or to jus in bello regulation.153 This long-
standing understanding was re-endorsed in the drafting work on 
UNCLOS and later in the 1994 San Remo Manual.154 It follows 
that the “peaceful purposes” clause enshrined in UNCLOS does 
not preclude the conduct of military activities and jus in bello 
applies to such activities. However, it is not clear the “peaceful 
purpose” clause has attained a status as a general international 
law principle which would apply blanketly across distinct do-
mains.155  
The Antarctic Treaty provides an alternative reading of 
“peaceful purposes.” While the high seas may be a closer anal-
ogy, Antarctica still shares several characteristics with outer 
space, which makes it a close runner-up analogy. First, any hu-
man inhabiting Antarctica will have to cope with an extremely 
harsh environment and a lack of resources, making them de-
pendent on large logistical efforts.156 Second, in the late 1950s, 
 
 150. OST, supra note 32, art. 2; UNCLOS, supra note 148, art. 89.  
 151. Jacob M. Harper, Technology, Politics, and the New Space Race: The 
Legality and Desirability of Bush’s National Space Policy Under the Public and 
Customary International Laws of Space, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 681, 693 (2008). 
 152. UNCLOS, supra note 148, art. 88 (“The high seas shall be reserved for 
peaceful purposes.”). 
 153. Kubo Mac̆ák, Silent War: Applicability of the Jus in Bello to Military 
Space Operations, 94 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 17 (2018). 
 154. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973–82, 4th 
Sess., 67th plen. mtg. ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.67 (Apr. 23, 1976), re-
printed in 5 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 62 (1976) (“The term ‘peaceful purposes’ did not, of 
course, preclude military activities generally.”); see also SAN REMO MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA ¶ 10 (Louise 
Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) (“[H]ostile actions by naval forces may be conducted 
in, on, or over . . . the high seas.”). 
 155. Alexander Proelβ, Peaceful Purposes, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. 
INT’L L. ¶ 22 (Nov. 2010), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/ 
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1453 [https://perma.cc/FT4N-Q2M8]. 
 156. Peterson, supra note 147, at 257.  
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most of Antarctica remained unexplored.157 The extent of natu-
ral resources in Antarctica was unknown and their location re-
mote.158 Lastly, the large distances separating Antarctica from 
other continents meant military installments were easy to estab-
lish but difficult to defend.159 However, despite these similari-
ties, the Antarctic Treaty’s “peaceful purposes” provision is dis-
tinguishable from the high seas and outer space since the treaty 
was drafted prior to any military activity occurring in Antarc-
tica. Therefore it is useful to note that in different global com-
mons contexts, “peaceful purposes” can include both military ac-
tivity and an absolute prohibition on military activity. As such, 
it must be discussed specifically in terms of outer space and a 
clear definition pronounced. 
B. LEGAL DEFINITIONS 
To ensure coherence and consistency across international 
law, there must be clear definitions of its key terms. Without 
clear definitions, the development of jus in bello for space will be 
plagued by inconsistencies and gaps. This Section details the de-
velopment of the definition of “peaceful purposes” as well as 
which weapons are proscribed under the OST. Section B.1 dis-
cusses the varied definition of the OST’s “peaceful purposes” and 
demonstrates its divergent implications. Section B.2 discusses 
the application of the OST’s prohibitions on weapons in space to 
ASATs. 
1. Peaceful Purposes 
The legality of military actions in outer space turns on the 
interpretation of the term “peaceful purposes” found in Article 
IV of the OST. While the adjective “peaceful” may be found in 
nearly all U.N. documents relating to outer space, nowhere does 
there exist an authoritative definition of “peaceful.”160 Conse-
quently, there emerged two competing schools of thought defin-
ing “peaceful purposes”: one camp, headed by the United States, 
argued it should be interpreted as “nonaggressive,” while the 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 258. 
 160. Christopher M. Petras, “Space Force Alpha” Military Use of the Inter-
national Space Station and the Concept of “Peaceful Purposes,” 53 A.F. L. REV. 
135, 168 (2002).  
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other camp, led by the Soviet Union, argued it should be inter-
preted as “non-military.”161  
The official position of the United States has always been 
that “peaceful” means “non-aggressive.”162 This stance was a log-
ical outgrowth of the fact that the United States already had mil-
itary intelligence satellites in space prior to the OST.163 Further-
more, the United States’ two major policy goals pre-OST were to 
gain international recognition of the permissibility of such satel-
lites, while simultaneously discouraging military space activi-
ties which threatened its satellites.164  
In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union inter-
preted “peaceful purposes” to mean “non-military” as part of its 
diplomatic attack to ban United States reconnaissance satel-
lites.165 This interpretation would totally bar all military activi-
ties in outer space. However, the U.S.S.R. consistently main-
tained that all its activities in space were “peaceful” and 
“scientific.”166 The Soviet Union’s official position softened as its 
military satellite program grew and it became increasingly de-
pendent on space technology for military planning.167 
Yet, it is likely the drafters of the OST did not intend for 
“peaceful purposes” to mean “non-military.” First, the OST per-
mits certain military activities in areas explicitly reserved “ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes” (the moon and other celestial 
bodies).168 And second, the OST makes international law (includ-
ing the right of self-defense) applicable to those same reserved 
areas.169 Under the modern current of space law, there is tacit 
agreement amongst principal space powers that all military ac-
tivities in space are permissible unless otherwise prohibited by 
international treaty or customary law.170 A general consensus 
 
 161. See Kuplic, supra note 90, at 1145. 
 162. Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communication Satel-
lites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and “Peaceful Purposes,” 60 J. AIR 
L. & COM. 237, 304 (1994). 
 163. See Kuplic, supra note 90, at 1145. 
 164. Petras, supra note 160, at 170 n.224.  
 165. Kuplic, supra note 90, at 1145–46; see also Petras, supra note 160, at 
171. 
 166. Petras, supra note 160, at 171.  
 167. Mitchell Ford, War on the Final Frontier: Can Twentieth-Century Space 
Law Combat Twenty-First-Century Warfare?, 39 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 237, 242–43 
(2017). 
 168. OST, supra note 32, art. 4. 
 169. Id. art. 3. 
 170. Morgan, supra note 162, at 303.  
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has developed within the U.N. that “peaceful” more specifically 
equates to “non-aggressive” and this sentiment generally aligns 
with State practice.171 Regardless of what side of “peaceful pur-
poses” one falls on, States can still develop ground-based ASAT 
technology that can fire weaponry from earth.172 The OST’s fail-
ure to address technologies and weapons such as ASATs has re-
sulted in a gap: What uses of weapons are prohibited in outer 
space? 
2. Prohibited Weapons 
The OST does not expressly prohibit deliberate attacks on 
satellites or prevent ASAT tests. Its sole stipulation prevents nu-
clear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.173 Notably, this 
provision implicitly allows for the use of ASATs and other space 
weapons.  
The basic term “space weapon” lacks a definition under in-
ternational law.174 Part of the definitional problematics arises 
over whether the international community should include in the 
definition of a space weapon “both weapons and targets located 
in space, direct and indirect applications of force, and the possi-
bility of temporary impairment as well as permanent destruc-
tion.”175 However, since most space systems are used equally for 
military and civilian purposes, space objects designed for peace-
ful purposes may become space weapons and destroy or damage 
other space systems.176 Additionally, it is not entirely obvious 
 
 171. Petras, supra note 160, at 172. No state has ever formally protested the 
U.S. version of “peaceful purposes” in the context of outer space activities. Id. 
at 171. 
 172. See Ford, supra note 167, at 244. 
 173. OST, supra note 32, art. 4. 
 174. See Ramey, supra note 84.  
 175. William Marshall et al., Space Weapons: The Urgent Debate, 1 J. SCI. & 
WORLD AFF. 19, 22 (2005). Certain technologies (kinetic-ASATs), specifically 
created with the capacity and intent of destroying satellites fit the traditional 
definition of space weapons. Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving 
Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Re-
gime for Space, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 871, 882 (2006). However, other technolo-
gies are more difficult to categorically classify. By way of example, technologies 
which strategically and temporarily occupy orbits, or technologies merely used 
to disrupt space activities of other space actors through encryption or jamming. 
Id. at 883. 
 176. A. Ferreira-Snyman, Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military 
Use of Outer Space, with Specific Reference to Article IV of the Outer Space 
Treaty, in 18 POTCHEFSTROOMSE ELEKTRONIESE REGSBLAD § 4.3 (2015); see also 
Ramey, supra note 84. 
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how to distinguish space weapons from space objects or space 
debris. Objects in orbit may travel at roughly 17,000 miles per 
hour which gives them the inherent ability to destroy or interfere 
with satellites in space.177 Since ASATs are not prohibited by the 
OST and there is no treaty regulating ASATs, this Note’s frame-
work works to curb the uncertainty surrounding the use of 
ASATs in outer space. The framework is needed to create param-
eters which consider the possible negative ramifications on civil-
ians, industries, and environments. 
C. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The fragility of outer space must be a principal concern in 
creating an effective legal regime governing armed conflict in 
space. Of particular note, the capacity of space is finite.178 There 
are limited useful orbits and the density of debris may result in 
a chain reaction of collisions which render orbits unusable or 
deny access to space by spacecraft.179 The impact on orbitals and 
the potential ignition of collisional cascading will likely alter the 
proportionality calculus.180 
1. Location 
A further complication is whether orbits are themselves le-
gitimate military objectives. Since orbits are locations which 
may offer a direct military advantage during a conflict, there is 
uncertainty regarding their status as legitimate military tar-
gets.181 Conversely, it may be argued that orbits are a natural 
environment which must be protected.182 In an advisory opinion 
by the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of 
nuclear weapons, the Court noted, “Respect for the environment 
is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is 
in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportional-
ity.”183 Whether an orbit is considered a legitimate military ob-
ject or a protected natural environment will impact the propor-
tionality calculus. If a State actor found that the orbit is a 
legitimate military target, then the resulting debris field is not 
 
 177. Ramey, supra note 84. 
 178. JOINT STAFF-MN//ACT, supra note 59, ¶ 103. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See supra Part II. 
 181. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 4, at 201. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 30 (July 8). 
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to be considered in the proportionality analysis because the ef-
fect of an attack on another legitimate military object is irrele-
vant. However, if it is found that the orbit is a natural environ-
ment to be protected, then resulting debris will need to be 
considered in the proportionality analysis.  
2. Debris 
Orbital debris has become a growing concern in recent years 
as space debris builds up in all three orbitals.184 It is now recog-
nized as a grave problem for current and future safe, successful 
operations in space.185 Despite international recognition of space 
debris as a debilitating issue, there does not exist a comprehen-
sive binding instrument at the regional or international level 
which regulates space debris.186 Much of this debris is uninten-
tional: comprised of decommissioned satellites, dropped tools 
from astronauts, failed components, and paint flecks.187 More 
than 500,000 pieces of debris are tracked as they orbit the 
Earth.188 Twenty-thousand pieces of debris are larger than a 
softball.189 There are millions of pieces of debris which are un-
trackable due to their small size.190 Each piece travels at speeds 
up to 30,000 kilometers per hour.191 Yet, even tiny paint flecks 
 
 184. JOINT STAFF-MN//ACT, supra note 59, ¶ 121; see supra Part I.B.1. 
 185. See Koplow, supra note 43, at 1202. 
 186. The strongest regulatory piece of space debris legislation is the Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee’s nonbinding Space Debris Miti-
gation Guidelines. See, e.g., INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION 
COMM., SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES (2007), https://www.unoosa 
.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/IADC-2002-01-IADC-Space_Debris-Guidelines 
-Revision1.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7Z6-JM8G] (including considerations such as: 
(1) Limiting the amount of debris released during normal operations; (2) Mini-
mizing the potential for break-ups during operational phases; (3) Minimizing 
potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy; (4) Limiting 
the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low 
Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission; and (5) Limiting the 
long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the 
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission). 
 187. See Koplow, supra note 43, at 1202. 
 188. Mark Garcia, Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA (Sept. 26, 
2013), https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html 
[https://perma.cc/LS5F-89WE]. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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can inflict catastrophic damage on spacecraft or obliterate satel-
lites when traveling at these velocities.192 Debris from an ASAT 
attack would generate thousands more random fragments and 
create a lethal orbiting cloud.193 There is concern that as the or-
bitals become increasingly cluttered, collisional cascading will 
occur. Any increase in space debris—even nominal—has the po-
tential to trigger the collision sequence. 
The risk of cascading build-up debris is known as the Kess-
ler Syndrome.194 Scholars and scientists theorize that at some 
point, the cascading effects of debris collisions will create “deadly 
rings of debris” that are sufficiently dense to bar access to space 
by spacecrafts and any attempt would likely result in those 
spacecrafts simply adding to the morass of space debris.195 While 
the “terminal condition” is not immediate, it would essentially 
prohibit the ability to launch new spacecraft, and damage exist-
ing satellites and space capacities in orbit.196 There have been 
two events in recent years which have served to escalate con-
cerns about space debris and ignite condemnation from the in-
ternational community.197 The first act occurred on January 11, 
2007 when the Chinese intentionally launched a missile to de-
stroy an inoperable weather satellite.198 The ASAT system was 
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launched and reached its target at an altitude of 537 miles which 
triggered a new ring of debris of about 3,000 trackable pieces.199 
The second act occurred on February 10, 2009 when the defunct 
Russian Kosmos 2251 weather satellite collided with the Iridium 
33 mobile communications spacecraft.200 This random collision 
generated roughly 3,000 pieces of new debris in LEO.201 While 
there is some debate as to whether Kessler syndrome is already 
ignited or yet to begin, the general consensus maintains that the 
density of derelict space objects has already exceeded the math-
ematical tipping point.202 In terms of the proportionality calcu-
lation, this will require careful attention to the amount of emer-
gent debris. 
This Note has taken stock of the aforementioned problemat-
ics with the space law regime and the difficulties in application 
of jus in bello to the unique physical characteristics of space. 
Keeping these considerations in mind, this Note has developed a 
framework which ultimately, helps military officers think 
through the varied elements of the proportionality calculus as it 
relates to space. 
III.  A WORKABLE FRAMEWORK FOR STATES TO 
IMPLEMENT WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER THE 
EMPLOYMENT OF HIT-TO-KILL OR JAMMING ASATS IS 
COMPLIANT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW   
This Part unfolds in four Sections. First, this Note argues 
that jus in bello is the applicable legal framework which governs 
armed conflict in outer space despite space’s non-terrestrial lo-
cation. Then, this Note provides a framework for State actors to 
employ when deciding whether the employment of hit-to-kill 
ASATs or jamming ASATs will comply with international law. 
Ultimately, it proposes each State actor should sufficiently note 
and balance the answers to four informative questions. Next, the 
Note addresses alternative approaches and discusses the defi-
ciencies regarding these approaches. Lastly, to demonstrate this 
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framework’s applicability, this Note walks through the frame-
work’s four questions and applies it to hit-to-kill and jamming 
ASATs.  
A. JUS IN BELLO APPLIES TO OUTER SPACE 
None of the provisions of jus in bello precisely apply to con-
duct in outer space.203 The relevant rules and doctrines use ter-
restrial vocabulary. For instance, Common Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions contain express references to the “ter-
ritory” of a State.204 Even still, States do not have total latitude 
to act as they please without expressly constraining rules.205 Nor 
are a State’s legal obligations necessarily conditioned upon a ge-
ographic location.206 The lack of “black letter rules” which explic-
itly state outer space is governed by jus in bello does not render 
outer space lawless nor jus in bello presumptively inapplicable. 
Instead, generally applicable rules of international law follow a 
State’s new activities even without specific instruments govern-
ing such activities. 
This was certainly true in the context of cyberspace. In the 
1990s it was argued that rules designed for the “offline world” 
did not reach to cyberspace.207 Yet two decades later, States from 
all regions of the world affirmed that they considered interna-
tional law applicable to conduct in cyberspace.208 The same ap-
proach applies to the application of international law and jus in 
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bello to State conduct in outer space. States clearly contemplated 
military action, and potentially armed conflict in outer space.209 
Without an express and persistent objection to the application of 
jus in bello to outer space, States have impliedly acquiesced to 
its application. This is bolstered by the fact that the OST explic-
itly references States’ obligation to carry out activities in accord-
ance with international law, including the United Nations Char-
ter.210 This explicit reference articulates States’ acquiescence to 
jus in bello applying to outer space. It would seem axiomatic that 
international law would apply to an arena where international 
State relationships exist. Furthermore, excluding outer space 
from the application of international humanitarian law is con-
trary to the purpose of the jus in bello regime. Jus in bello seeks 
to ameliorate suffering and violence in armed conflict to the 
greatest extent possible.211 As codified in Common Article 1, a 
provision widely considered to be binding on all State-actors, 
States have a specific obligation to ensure and respect jus in bello 
“in all circumstances,” including conduct in outer space.212 Since 
jus in bello is applicable, it is necessary to take stock of its unique 
features and determine how the proportionality calculus will op-
erate in the outer space context. 
B. THE FRAMEWORK’S FOUR GUIDING QUESTIONS 
By reviewing the jus in bello regime, the outer space legal 
regime, and the unique physical characteristics of outer space, 
this Note synthesizes a workable framework into four main 
questions. Any State actor deciding whether to target a satellite 
in space should guide their decision according to the answers of 
the following four questions: (1) What is the operational nature 
of the target? (2) Where is the target situationally located? 
(3) What is the anticipated harm to civilians and the environ-
ment? (4) What is the military advantage expected to be gained? 
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1. Operational Nature of the Target 
The starting point for the proportionality determination is 
the operational nature of the target. If the satellite is a military 
reconnaissance satellite, the offensive is likely compliant with 
international law, provided any resultant debris does not create 
excessive damage to civilian objects. The proportionality princi-
ple is only triggered if civilian injury or objects are implicated in 
the offense.213 However, if the satellite is a dual-use satellite, 
there must be a further inquiry into the exact nature of the civil-
ian use and whether it is essential to the civilian population. 
There are multiple lenses through which to view civilian use. 
One such lens may be the sort of information the satellite pro-
vides.214 For instance, is the satellite simply a weather satellite, 
or is it used to support medical services? Or, what if it is a com-
munications satellite? The loss of a weather satellite could put 
civilians and civilian objects at risk. For example, weather sat-
ellites notify users of potentially dangerous weather conditions. 
Such information is necessary to warn civilians of hurricanes, 
tornadoes, or other devastating natural disasters. Without the 
ability to know weather patterns and warn civilians, civilians 
would be at risk of death or bodily harm. The only constraint on 
this evaluation is foreseeability and whether the damage is too 
remote to include in the proportionality calculation. Similarly, 
the disruption to a satellite which supports medical services 
could directly impact civilian health and life. However, the death 
or injuries resulting from the destruction of a satellite that sup-
ports medical services are more foreseeable and closely linked to 
the destruction than a weather satellite. If a communications 
satellite was attacked, mobile networks and the internet would 
shut down. Cities would launch into chaos as traffic lights and 
railroad switches freeze.215 Again, the only limit is whether the 
resulting damage was reasonably foreseeable to the military of-
ficer and the injury or harm was proximately caused by the sat-
ellite’s disruption. The calamitous effects that damage to any one 
of the satellites could have on civilian life and property is signif-
icant regardless of the specific information it provides.  
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A second lens may be how many civilians use this satellite’s 
services.216 Are there thousands of users? Hundreds of thou-
sands? Millions? And what is the difference between these num-
bers in practice? It is impossible to draw a line in the sand and 
say that disrupting the service for 10,000 civilian users is okay, 
but a disruption for 10,001 users is too much. Instead, using a 
third, hybrid lens affords a military officer the flexibility to con-
sider both discrete hypothetical numbers and civilian and socie-
tal interests. The hybrid lens will consider together the satel-
lite’s civilian use and the effect of its disruption on essential 
civilian tasks and the sheer number of civilians using the satel-
lite. The most balanced lens is a hybrid lens. A hybrid lens is 
better suited to balancing competing interests and forcing a 
more thoughtful analysis. For example, if a million people use 
the satellite but only for weather conditions, is that sufficient to 
breach proportionality? The answer to this question becomes 
clearer after answering the three following questions. Once a 
State actor has determined the operational nature of the target, 
then it must next consider the satellite’s location. 
2. Target’s Location 
There must also be due consideration of where the satellite 
is located. The proportionality analysis will look different de-
pending upon whether the satellite occupies LEO, MEO, or GEO 
space.217 This is, in part, because of the anticipated harm debris 
may cause in a more crowded orbit. This analysis is further ex-
panded upon infra Part III.B.3. Additionally, the analysis will 
bifurcate depending on whether the orbital is considered a natu-
ral environment or a legitimate military target. Under a natural-
environment approach, the officer must evaluate to what extent 
the environment will be affected.218 Whereas under the legiti-
mate-military-target approach, the officer need only determine 
the operational nature of the target and balance it with the ex-
pected military advantage to be gained. While State actors may 
be more inclined to view orbitals as military targets in order to 
circumvent the environmental harm analysis, this Note stresses 
that the orbital should be considered a natural environment due 
to the fact space is a global common and as such, the immediate 
effect of an attack will be detrimental and blanketly applied to 
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all nation-states. As such, any harm to the orbital must be con-
sidered in the proportionality analysis as an environmental 
harm. 
3. Civilian and Environmental Harm 
The resultant harm in the proportionality analysis will need 
to account for both civilian death, injury, damage, and environ-
mental harm. For civilian harm, the analysis will need to evalu-
ate whether injury to civilians and civilian objects is excessive. 
Bearing in mind, mere inconveniences associated with armed 
conflict are not sufficient to tip the scales in favor of a propor-
tionality principle breach219 because normal war-time inconven-
iences are to be expected.220 In contemporary armed conflict sit-
uations, the crux of the issue is whether internet, general 
communications, and other types of satellite-service disruptions 
constitute a “mere inconvenience”—completely irrelevant to the 
proportionality analysis—or whether they constitute excessive 
damage. At this point in the analysis, it is important to recall the 
distinction between extensive from excessive.221 Excessiveness is 
measured in light of the military advantage expected to be 
gained.222 Therefore, targeting a satellite which causes extensive 
damage to internet communications, weather satellites, or other 
satellite services may be legally justified by the military value of 
the target.223 But, just because it is not per se unlawful does not 
mean that it is lawful. Instead, because of our dependence on 
internet connections, weather satellites, and other communica-
tions for the full range of a wide variety of civilian tasks, it is 
likely that damage to a satellite which provides these services to 
a lot of people will be considered not only extensive, but also ex-
cessive. The amount and type of damage may vary depending on 
the satellite’s function, but the more States come to rely on sat-
ellites for civilian and commercial purposes, as well as masked 
military purposes, the more attractive they become as targets, 
despite the prohibition on intentionally targeting civilians. In 
any case, the decision whether destroying a satellite will be ex-
cessive or simply extensive implicates a fact-dependent inquiry, 
and holding that distinction in mind, this Note will now turn to 
the compounded environmental harm. 
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Like civilian harm, the environmental harm must be ac-
counted for—this determination turns on how many pieces of de-
bris an attack would create and how many pieces are acceptable. 
While there likely is no magic number of debris pieces which 
would automatically bar military action under international law, 
the satellite’s position in LEO, MEO, or GEO will influence the 
officer’s calculation. For example, in the already-polluted LEO 
space, the proportionality threshold may be lower as any result-
ant debris could potentially ignite the Kessler Syndrome.224 In 
the MEO or GEO, the threshold may be higher since there is less 
clutter.225 Alternatively, the measurement of environmental 
harm could be catalogued as access to space, and thus, a breach 
turns upon whether resultant debris was sufficiently dense to 
bar access to space by spacecrafts. The environmental damage 
should be measured differently for each orbit as the number of 
trackable pieces which stay in orbit, including any debris from 
further collisions. This approach sufficiently considers the differ-
ences in orbitals and the real possibility any trackable debris 
piece could collide and create additional space debris. However 
environmental harm is calculated, that harm is compounded 
with civilian harm. Meaning, both are measured together 
against the military advantage expected to be gained. 
4. Anticipated Military Advantage Expected to Be Gained 
After detailing the prospective negative ramifications of an 
attack, the officer must balance those considerations against the 
military advantage expected to be gained. The standard will be 
a “reasonable military officer” similarly situated with the same 
amount of information available at the time.226 As discussed in 
Part I.C.2, this calculation is highly subjective and imprecise.227 
But the following questions may help carve out some of the un-
certainty and leave the military officer with a more complete 
idea of the military advantage expected to be gained.  
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[1.] How important is the military objective sought to be achieved?  
[2.] What are the pros and cons of each option available to achieve that 
objective?  
[3.] For each option, what is the probability of success?  
[4.] What are the costs of failure?  
[5.] What are the risks of civilian casualties involved in each option?  
[6.] What are the risks of military casualties involved in each option?  
[7.] How are casualties of either kind to be weighed against the benefits 
of the operation?228 
These questions are not easily answered, but a military of-
ficer’s answers are not required to predict the future or be fool-
proof. Rather, these answers should be reasonable based on the 
current intel the military officer has at their disposal and on the 
accepted military operational law the officer is applying. Mili-
tary officers have been making these difficult calls for decades. 
Since warfare has transitioned from battlefields to populated ur-
ban areas, the principle of distinction and proportionality have 
been particularly prickly. As warfare adapts, so should military 
officers, and the proportionality principle in jus in bello. This 
new frontier is not a total departure from the jus in bello regime. 
It simply requires military officers to expand their concept of ci-
vilian casualty and property damage to its proper scope in the 
current satellite era. Therefore, when considering whether to 
target a dual-use satellite, the military officer should answer 
these questions with an eye towards a realistic perspective of the 
resultant harm. This is a more expansive perspective than a ter-
restrially-based proportionality calculus.229 Yet, it is essential in 
this upcoming and current Space Age. 
Considering the operational nature of the target, its loca-
tion, the anticipated harm to civilians and the environment, and 
the military advantage expected to be gained, will provide a 
State actor with the necessary tools to make an appropriate de-
termination in line with international law. To further demon-
strate the comprehensiveness of this framework, this Note next 
discusses the deficiencies in alternative approaches. Namely, 
that other approaches sorely overestimate the political will of 
States to create binding, restrictive obligations regarding space.  
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C. THE DEFICIENCIES OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO 
REGULATING JUS IN BELLO IN OUTER SPACE 
Opponents may argue that this framework does not suffi-
ciently patch the disparate pieces of international law, which to-
gether are used to temper the use of force in space. Instead, op-
ponents argue for a multilateral treaty defining the imprecise 
terms and creating different rules which account for outer 
space’s unique physical character. However, this approach is 
misguided: alternative methods include theoretical rather than 
practical solutions. Multilateral treaties signed and ratified by 
space-faring nations are unlikely.230 As the United States re-
treats from international obligations and treaties; while Russia, 
China, India, and North Korea will increase militarized space 
capacities, this shift creates divergent, at-odds interests which 
cannot be addressed by a comprehensive treaty.231 Already there 
are the beginnings of an arms race and Cold-War-mentality re-
appearing. This is clearly evidenced from the most recent India 
ASAT test. Prime Minister Modi couched the ASAT test’s justi-
fication in the same rhetoric that India uses to defend its nuclear 
arsenal, that it is a deterrent.232 If anything, India’s ASAT test 
demonstrates a “languishing international effort to ensure space 
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remains a peaceful and secure environment.”233 It is important 
to note that this framework is not meant to prevent an arms race 
nor convince States that do not normally observe international 
law to begin observing the law. Rather, it provides law-observing 
States a workable framework to use to ensure they are compliant 
with international law and preserve space. As such, this frame-
work effectively draws on accepted customary international law, 
jus in bello principles, and ratified space law to fill the gaps until 
such a meeting of the minds allows for a multilateral treaty. Its 
workability is further demonstrated through its application to 
hit-to-kill and jamming ASATs. 
D. THE FRAMEWORK AS APPLIED TO HIT-TO-KILL AND JAMMING 
ASATS 
Under the framework’s questions, hit-to-kill ASATs require 
more consideration. While it is likely hit-to-kill ASATs are com-
pliant with international law, it is dependent on the balance of 
military advantage, civilian losses, and environmental harm. 
The analysis begins with an inquiry of the operational nature of 
the satellite. If it is a dual-use satellite and civilians or their 
property is harmed, what is the extent and nature of that harm? 
More weight will be given to proximate and actual harm to civil-
ian life, property, and the environment. The more remote the 
harm is, the less likely it will affect the proportionality calcula-
tion. Here, the type of information or service the satellite pro-
vides is critical. If it is a communications satellite which only 
supports one mobile phone company, it may not rise to the level 
of excessive. If it is a communications satellite which affects the 
lifeblood of the world’s economy, it may rise to excessiveness. A 
satellite may have numerous functions; therefore, it is important 
to distinguish each function and view them in their totality. 
Next, where is the satellite located? And how much debris is 
caused? Depending on the satellite’s location and causal debris, 
the damage may be disproportionate to the military advantage 
expected to be gained. It is important to keep in mind that any 
resultant debris automatically becomes another kinetic ASAT by 
virtue of its velocity and speed. For example, if it is in the LEO 
and it totally or partially bars access to space, it is disproportion-
ate. If it is in the GEO and it does not secondarily affect any 
global positioning satellites, it is not disproportionate. It is true 
that the use of hit-to-kill ASATs will be a fact-dependent inquiry, 
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yet there is a greater likelihood this sort of kinetic ASAT would 
be prohibited under jus in bello than other forms of space wea-
ponry due to the resultant debris and its potential to eviscerate 
secondary satellites and block access to space. While the civilian 
harm might not breach the proportionality principle, if the re-
sultant debris is severe, then the compounded environmental 
harm would trigger the proportionality principle and bar action. 
On the other hand, jamming ASATs are likely compliant 
with jus in bello since they do not create debris problematics. Of 
course, any disruption of civilian usage would have to be bal-
anced against the military advantage. But even if there was ex-
tensive disruption of civilian services, that does not necessitate 
excessive civilian damage, which is dependent upon the military 
advantage. Ultimately, while the calculation appears manipu-
latable and subject to State discretion, walking through the 
framework causes State actors to deliberate and think about the 
ways in which international law may be breached and take pre-
cautions against such a breach. 
CONCLUSION 
As the world develops and more States gain spacefaring ca-
pabilities, it is likely conflicts will no longer be earth-bound and 
move into outer void space. As this shift in the world begins, it is 
essential States maintain viable laws of war applicable and well-
adapted to space. While this Note echoes the hopes of other 
scholars that States renounce as unacceptable all acts of hostil-
ity in outer space, it is more likely States will instead, unlock 
this new domain and use it for war.234 To that end, this Note’s 
framework is a first step towards moderating State action during 
armed conflict by the limitations imposed by law. Namely, the 
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